Contextuality in Human Decision Making in the Presence of Direct
  Influences: A Comment on Basieva et al. (2019) by Yearsley, James M & Halliwell, Jonathan J
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
12
57
0v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
NC
]  
7 M
ay
 20
19
Contextuality in Human Decision Making in the Presence of Direct
Influences: A Comment on Basieva et al. (2019).
James M Yearsley
Department of Psychology,
City, University of London,
EC1V 0HB, UK
Jonathan J Halliwell
Blackett Laboratory,
Imperial College,
London SW7 2AZ, UK
In a recent paper Basieva, Cervantes, Dzhafarov, and Khrennikov (2019) presented a series of
experiments which they claimed show evidence for contextuality in human judgments. This
was based on a set of modified Bell-like inequalities designed to rule out effects caused by
signalling. In this comment we show that it is, however, possible to construct a non-contextual
model which explains the experimental data via direct influences. We trace the apparent in-
consistency to a definition of signalling which does not account for all possible forms of direct
influence. Further, we cast doubt on the idea that any experimental data in psychology could
provide conclusive evidence for contextuality.
Introduction
As part of the broader quantum cognition program
a number of researchers have considered whether
there is evidence for violation of contextual inequal-
ities in psychology (e.g., Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo
(2013), Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, and Tanaka
(2014), Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, and Sitbon (2015),
Bruza, Wang, and Busemeyer (2015)). Such inequali-
ties are derived on the assumption that there exist hidden
joint preference or probability states for the psychological
observables being measured. This is, loosely, equivalent
to assuming that judgment processes giving rise to choices
between different options operate independently, which is
an important constraint on the processes underlying human
decision making.
One complicating factor is that it is hard to rule out the
possibility of direct influence between measurements, which
can mimic the effect of true contextuality. In other words,
contextuality means the outcome of a judgment about ob-
servable A can depend on what else is being measured, but
that can also occur if the outcome of the other measurements
directly influence A.
The absence of such direct influences must be justified or
explicitly tested in any particular application. In physics such
influences can sometimes be ruled out by reference to some
physical principle, but nothing equivalent in psychology can
be used to rule out direct influences a priori. The challenge
of quantifying exactly when violations of contextual inequal-
ities can be accounted for by direct influences, and when they
can only be explained by genuine contextuality, was taken up
by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) who derived modified in-
equalities which, they claim, allow the identification of true
contextuality not explainable by signalling (We will explain
the distinction between direct influence and signalling be-
low.).
In a series of papers Dzhafarov and collaborators re-
analyzed existing experimental claims of contextuality in
psychology and concluded they could all be explained by
direct influences (Dzhafarov, Zhang, and Kujala (2016),
Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016)).
However in an elegant paper Cervantes and Dzhafarov
(2018) presented an experiment which did satisfy their
modified contextual inequality, and in a recent paper
Basieva et al. (2019) followed this up with series of experi-
ments, the majority of which produced data demonstrating
genuine contextuality according to Dzhafarov and Kujala’s
modified inequalities.
In this comment we explain why we do not believe that the
results presented by Basieva et al. (2019) provide compelling
evidence for contextuality in human decision making. We
only consider in detail the form of experiment conducted by
Basieva et al. (2019) and Cervantes and Dzhafarov (2018),
but we use the insight gained to question whether contex-
tuality could ever be observable in human decision making.
Outline of Basieva et al. (2019)
Consider one of the experiments in Basieva et al. (2019);
“Alice wishes to order a two-course meal. For each course
she can choose a high-calorie option (indicated by H) or a
low-calorie option (indicated by L). Alice does not want both
courses to be high-calorie nor does she want both of them to
be low-calorie.”
Each participant was given two out of three courses
(Starter, Main, Dessert) to choose from. Clearly participants
should select options so that while the calorie content of, eg,
the starter is undetermined, it is anti-correlated with the calo-
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rie content of the main (indeed this restriction was forced
on participants in the experiment.) We can easily see why
Basieva et al. (2019) expect to see evidence of contextuality
- the underlying probability distribution for all three courses
needs to have three binary anti-correlated variables, which is
impossible. In other words, the calorie content of at least two
of the dishes has to match, since there are three courses and
only two calorie options, but then one cannot have the three
choices anti-correlating.
The specific inequality Basieva et al. (2019) are testing for
the experiment we outlined above is given by,
∆ = |E[R11] − E[R
3
1]| + |E[R
1
2] − E[R
2
2]| + |E[R
2
3] − E[R
3
3]| < 2
(1)
Here E[·] denotes an expectation value, and Rmn refers to
the random variable Rn, taking values ±1, measured in the
context m. For example context 1 might be the condition
where participants were asked to choose options for Starter
and Main. This is a special case of Dzhafarov and Kujala’s
(2015) more general inequalities, and if it is satisfied Dzha-
farov and Kujala (2015) would claim genuine contextuality.
What Basieva et al. (2019) did was to show this inequality
was satisfied by data collected in a number of different ex-
periments which were variants of the one outlined above.
However it is intuitively obvious how participants could
solve the problem set by Basieva et al. (2019); given two
courses to select, eg starter and main, choose the calorie
content of the first one randomly, then make the opposite
choice for the second course. This complies with the instruc-
tions and is ‘non-contextual’ in a colloquial sense, since it
makes no reference to measurement contexts. However it
does not sit well with the idea of a pre-existing preference,
since one of the judgments is made deterministically based
on the other, with no reference to existing preferences. We
therefore need to apply a more precise measure of contextu-
ality. Also, as described, this strategy has the feature that it
will tend to produce equal preferences for each course, which
is not what was observed in Basieva et al. (2019). So we need
to establish that this heuristic can generalise to cases where
the preferences are not equal.
A Non-Contextual Account
To be precise, we take non-contextuality to be defined
as follows: a given set of data possesses a non-contextual
model if and only if there exists a joint probability distri-
bution matching the set of marginal probabilities character-
izing the data. Contextuality is thus defined to be the ab-
sence of such a distribution. This definition of contextual-
ity is essentially the same as that frequently employed both
in physics (see for example Abramsky and Brandenburger
(2011)) and in cognitivemodels in psychology (see for exam-
ple, Oaksford and Chater (2007)). However, different defini-
tions are sometimes employed and in particular Dzhafarov
and Kujala (2015) proposed a more restricted definition of
non-contextuality (which thus implies a weaker notion of
contextuality), and we will return to this below.
Let us begin with our idealized version of the experiment:
assume participants solve the problem by choosing the calo-
rie content of the first course randomly, then making the op-
posite choice for the second course. The expectation value of
any of the variables therefore equals zero, regardless of the
context in which it is measured. That means,
∆ = 0 (2)
so Eq.(1) is satisfied and Dzhafarov and Kujala would pre-
sumably claim genuine contextuality in this case.
However it is possible to write down a probability distri-
bution on the variables R1
1
,R1
2
,R2
2
,R2
3
,R3
1
,R3
3
, which has these
correlations and expectation values;
p(R11,R
1
2,R
2
2,R
2
3,R
3
1,R
3
3) =
1
64
(1−R11R
1
2)(1−R
2
2R
2
3)(1−R
3
1R
3
3)
(3)
Note E[R1
1
,R1
2
] = −1 etc, as required, and E[Ri
j
] = 0 for all
variables and contexts. This proves a non-contextual account
of this idealisation of the Basieva et al. (2019) experiments
is possible. The explanation is a direct influence of R1
1
on
R1
2
etc, such that the value of one random variable in a given
context is set equal to minus the value of the other one.
We note an interesting property of this probability distri-
bution, which is that it clearly factorises as;
p(R11,R
1
2,R
2
2,R
2
3,R
3
1,R
3
3) = p(R
1
1,R
1
2)p(R
2
2,R
2
3)p(R
3
1,R
3
3) (4)
One consequence is that correlation functions between the
same variable in different contexts are zero, eg E[R1
1
R3
1
] = 0.
The reason, in terms of a process account, is that R3
1
is ba-
sically set by R3
3
, which is an independent random variable.
So the effect of the direct influence is to remove correlations
between the same variable in different contexts.
This idealisation is interesting, because the fact the ex-
pectation values of all individual variables are all zero means
the modified contextual inequality of Dzhafarov and Kujala’s
(2015) reduces to the one in the absence of signalling. In
other words, although our account of this experiment in-
volves direct influence between variables measured in the
same context, the framework of Dzhafarov and Kujala re-
gards this as being a scenario with no signalling. This
suggests the origin of the discrepancy between the claims
in Cervantes and Dzhafarov (2018) and Basieva et al. (2019)
and our demonstration of non-contextuality lies in the defini-
tion of signalling used by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015). We
will explore this further below.
Our idealisation of the experiments in Basieva et al.
(2019) is informative, but the results they reported had non-
zero expectation values for R1
1
,R2
2
and R3
3
. We can modify
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our account to deal with this by taking the joint probability
to have the same form as Eq.(4) above, where now,
p(Rmi ,R
m
j ) =
1
4
(1 + (Rmi − R
m
j )E[R
m
i ] − R
m
i R
m
j ) (5)
where E[Rmm] are the measured expectation values.
This obviously has the correct values for the measured ex-
pectation values and correlations. It also has the same in-
terpretation, namely that there is a direct influence between,
eg R1
1
and R1
2
, such that, on measuring the value of R1
1
, the
value of R1
2
is set to minus this. The correlations between
variables measured in different contexts are no longer zero,
however we have E[Rm
i
Rn
i
] = E[Rm
i
]E[Rn
i
], so they are still
independent. There are no constraints on the E[Rmm] in order
that this construction be valid.
We have therefore shown by explicitly constructing a
joint probability distribution that the experimental results re-
ported in Basieva et al. (2019) can be accounted for by a non-
contextual model which includes direct influences.
Different Notions of Signalling and Contextuality
The roots of our disagreement with Basieva et al. (2019)
lie in the work of Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) which may
be regarded as a generalization of the famous result of Fine
(1982) who established the conditions under which certain
sets of marginal probabilities possess a joint probability dis-
tribution. A crucial assumption in Fine’s work is that over-
lapping pairwise marginal probabilities are compatible with
each other, a condition referred to as marginal selectivity,
which in the present application reduces to a set of simple
conditions of the form
E[R
j
i
] = E[Rki ], (6)
in other words, the average values of all variablesR
j
i
are inde-
pendent of context. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) essentially
demonstrate how to extend Fine’s result to embrace the case
in which marginal selectivity fails.
This generalized Fine’s theorem leads to a set of condi-
tions (of which Eq.(2) is an example) which Dzhafarov and
Kujala (2015) claim to be tests for contextuality in the pres-
ence of signalling. However, their derivation of these condi-
tions involves two features of note. The first is that they de-
fine signalling as a failure of conditions such as Eq.(6), which
is reasonable, but this does not fully characterise ‘direct in-
fluence’. We would regard this definition of signalling as
capturing the average degree of direct influence, since it con-
cerns expectation values of observables. We would instead
argue, inspired by examples from physics, that the presence
of direct influence is more fully characterized by non-zero
values of probabilities of the form p(R
j
i
, Rk
i
) (i.e, the proba-
bilities that the same variable measured in different contexts
gives different results). Indeed this possibility occurs in our
model above where direct influence is present trial to trial
but averages to zero. (We note however that this stronger no-
tion of influence may not be readily detectable without more
elaborate measurements, a key qualitative difference to the
weaker notion based on Eq.(6) which involves measurable
quantities.)
The second feature is that, as indicated earlier, they em-
ploy a definition of non-contextuality more restricted than
ours, in which the underlying joint probability is required to
change as little as possible across different contexts (mean-
ing that probabilities of the form p(R
j
i
, Rk
i
) are minimized).
This requirement in fact implies that the more complete char-
acterisation of direct influence stated above coincides with
signalling, which is why the distinction between different no-
tions of influence is not apparent in their work.
We thus see that the claims of Dzhafarov & Kujala (2015)
about the presence of contextuality beyond that explainable
by direct influence hinge on notions of signalling and of
contextuality which are both weaker than those commonly
used in physics and psychology. By contrast the stronger
notions described in this paper permit the construction of a
non-contextual model.
To put this another way, in order to claim contextuality, it
is necessary to show that there is no other possible account
of the correlations. In physics it is necessary to go to some
lengths to be sure of this. The attitude one needs to adopt is
of the ‘worst case scenario’, where the direct influence is as
hard to detect as possible. Only by ruling out this sort of stub-
born direct influence can we be sure that a non-contextual
account is impossible. In contrast, focussing on changes to
the marginal distributions can be thought of as a ‘best case
scenario’, where the direct influence is as easy to detect as
possible. Ruling out changes to the average distributions is
necessary, but not sufficient to rule out direct influences, be-
cause one could imagine, for example, that the process of
measuring A changes the correlation between A and B, but
not the averages. This clearly implies a direct influence be-
tween A and B, but one which is not detectable from the
marginals alone.
For this reason we are not convinced the modified Bell/LG
inequalities proposed by Dzhafarov & Kujala (2015) suffice
to rule out all possible non-contextual accounts. However it
might be the case that their analysis can be adapted, by in-
cluding reference to higher order signalling correlations for
example, in a way that would rule out the models we propose
above. We are currently working on such an analysis.
Discussion
The above results raise an interesting question; is it ever
possible to rule out direct influences in a psychology setting?
This remains an open question, but we suspect the answer
is negative. In physics one can always reproduce the results
of quantum theory with a model which is non-contextual but
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non-local (Bohm, 1952). In physics such accounts can be
ruled out on the basis of a physical principle, locality, but this
is an additional assumption going beyond statements about
the statistics of measurements. There is nothing equivalent
in psychology that would supply such a clear cut limit on the
set of allowable models.
Does this mean contextual inequalities have nothing to
teach us in psychology? Not necessarily. It has previ-
ously been argued (Yearsley & Pothos, 2014) that data sat-
isfying Dzhafarov and Kujala’s (2015) inequalities presents
us with a choice - either we can construct a model which is
non-contextual but which involves unobservable direct influ-
ences, or we can construct a model which only involves ob-
served quantities, but which combines them in a contextual
way. The correct way to proceed is not fixed by any mathe-
matical law, but depends on the goals of the researcher.
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